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Awareness of, & 
adaptability  to, 
modified 
‘Levels of Service’Robustness
• Resilience to multi-hazards (& shocks) & cascading effects 
• Integrating ‘technical’ dimensions of resilience with ‘social’,  ‘organisational’, ‘economic’ 
dimensions toward an holistic resilience assessment.  












































• ‘observation-based’ - from evidence & learning to transferable models
• ‘analysis-based’ - cross-calibration with analytical models  
• ‘expert-based’ - ‘reality check’ with end-users  
• Resilience to multi-hazards (& shocks) & cascading effects 
• Integrating ‘technical’ dimensions of resilience with ‘social’,  ‘organisational’, ‘economic’ 
dimensions toward an holistic resilience assessment.  
Towards more Resilient Infrastructure Systems 
On-going Projects and International Collaborations:
• Projecting Damage and Losses for 
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Integrated bridge-utility systems: performance based 
assessment and mitigation of earthquake-induced 
physical and functional impacts 
Decision support system for post‐earthquake 
rehabilitation of sewerage systems: A project 
management perspective
• Earthquake-Flood Multi-hazard 
Impacts on Lifeline Systems following 
the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
2010-2011
A multi-hazard framework for assessing 
and managing flooding hazard in a 
seismically active low-lying urban 
environment
Website under construction 
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subsidence & surface crust
‘rafting’, sediment & other
pollutants released
tsunami; sea level rise; erosion; 




bank & shoreline failure
Multi-hazards are? 












- Holocene coast ~6500 y BP
- Inland extent of heavy lifelines 
network damage
- Inland limit of increased 
flooding vulnerability









21st century population 
concentration in megacities 
vulnerable to coastal quake 
multi-hazards
Multi-hazard prone infrastructure? 
e.g. coastal settlements
– terrain deformation (river & land profile changes, runoff, swales, pipe strain)
– liquefaction
– river channel capacity loss via constriction from rafting & bed uplift
– relative sea level rise: land levels, estuary/ river drainage, groundwater depths
– pipe network damage (breaks, sediment load & deposits, connection failures)
– domino effects of subterranean erosion (roads), waste water interactions
• 2014 GEER Report http://www.geerassociation.org/GEER_Post%20EQ%20Reports/Christchurch_Flood_2014/index.html
• 2013-15 IFV research by Holland (MSc) & Ko (PhD) drainage network & stormwater foci: 
http://www.civil.canterbury.ac.nz/postgrads/sko.shtml
• 2015-16 TCLEE monograph
Multi-hazards link the ‘un-linkable’ 
Lifelines & Increased Flooding Vulnerability (IFV) Project
Object-Oriented Framework for Infrastructure Modelling and Simulation 
(OOFIMS)
The software (in Matlab language) was developed in Rome within SYNER-G
https://sites.google.com/a/uniroma1.it/oofims/home
Christchurch stormwater network
Prediction of physical damage and overflow
Network topology
Christchurch stormwater network
Prediction of physical damage and overflow
Network subcatchments
Christchurch stormwater network
Prediction of physical damage and overflow
Analysis of a portion of the network enclosed within one CBD subcatchment
Christchurch stormwater network
Prediction of physical damage and overflow
Physical damage indicators: maximum expected number of leaks and breakage probability
Original materials All pipes made of ductile iron
Christchurch stormwater network
Prediction of physical damage and overflow
Overflow probability
Expected overflow during a given rain 
event
Christchurch stormwater network
Prediction of physical damage and overflow
Flood height before and after
the earthquake, to assess the 
Increased Flooding
Vulnerability (IFV)
Electric power network case studies
Prediction of physical damage, connectivity and serviceability indicators
Network nodes and lines
Case study #1: Sicily power network
Electric power network case studies
Prediction of physical damage, connectivity and serviceability indicators
Case study #1: Sicily power network
Faults affecting Sicily and 
simulated PGA shake map
Power flow analysis,
Mean Voltage Ratio (VR), 
Voronoi diagram
Electric power network case studies
Prediction of physical damage, connectivity and serviceability indicators
Case study #2: IEEE-118 bus power network
Electric power network case studies
Prediction of physical damage, connectivity and serviceability indicators
Case study #2: IEEE-118 bus power network
Simulated PGA shake map
Power flow analysis,
Mean Voltage Ratio (VR), 
Voronoi diagram
Christchurch electric power network
Prediction of physical damage, connectivity and serviceability indicators
Orion network with PGA shake map, Feb 2011 event




• Pre-disaster: classify or ‘inventorise’ system into hierarchy of 
elements with locations and attributes











Voltage, power rating, age, 
usage statistics
Damage:
Where? What? How bad?
Attributes:










• robustness, redundancy, 
resourcefulness, rapidity
• technical, organisational, 
social
Why is it important?
Vulnerability of elements






Infrastructure system Components Component attributes
Electric power Generation plants Capacity, seismic design level
Substations Voltage, seismic design level
Cables Material, size
Potable water Wells Seismic design level
Water treatment plants Capacity, seismic design level
Pumping stations Capacity, seismic design level
Storage tanks Elevation, material, geometry, quantity of contents, 
seismic design level
Pipelines Material, joint type, age, diameter
Waste water Lift stations Capacity, seismic design level
Treatment plants Capacity, seismic design level
Pipelines Material, joint type, age, diameter
Natural gas Pipelines Material, joint type, age, diameter
Compressor stations Capacity, seismic design level
Fuel Refineries Capacity, seismic design level
Pumping stations Capacity, seismic design level
Storage tanks Elevation, material, geometry, quantity of contents, 
seismic design level
Pipelines Material, joint type, age, diameter
Telecommunications Central offices Seismic design level
Cables Material, size
Highways Roadways Importance level
Bridges Structural system, material, age, geometry, seismic 
design level
Tunnels Construction method, geometry, local geology
Embankments Height, soil type
Thank you for your attention
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Ashfall characteristics are  variable 





 Volcanic ash is the most likely volcanic 
hazard to affect the most people during an 
explosive eruption
 Volcanic eruptions can cause a range of impacts.  
 Exotic impacts.  Mitigation options??
 Potentially long duration, multi-stage, multi-
hazard
 Infrequent eruptions 
 Limited opportunities to develop experience
 So how do we learn?
 Limited knowledge base of impacts + mitigation 
compared to other perils
 dominated by only several eruptions
Volcanic Impact Study Group
 Hosted by Auckland Lifelines Group
 Subcommittee
 National Focus
 Researcher + practitioner  membership
 Strong user-researcher partnership 
 strong culture of supporting research to 
practise
 Multi-disciplinary
 Funding support for applied research project
 Leveraging off larger Natural Hazard Research 
Platform + DEVORA funding
Research Context – Ash Impact Research
• Over the past 20 years our New Zealand 
research group (and collaborators) have 
aimed to undertake a sustained and 
systematic approach to volcanic impact 
assessment 
- critical infrastructure: electricity, 
water supplies, wastewater, land and 
air transport, telecommunications 
- ash cleanup and disposal
- primary industries, e.g. agriculture
- social impacts
- emergency management
Addressing Knowledge Gap: Recon Trips



























 Volcanic Ash Testing Lab (VATLab)
 Empirical experiments of components 
and systems which are vulnerable
 Laboratory testing  in controlled environment
 Engineering College
 UC re-development – investment
Addressing Knowledge Gap
Fostering Research Partnerships
 2009: AELG-19: Impact of Ash on Electricity, 
Telecommunications, Broadcasting Networks
 Electricity systems susceptible to ash fall induced outage
 Identified knowledge gaps
 Threshold for insulator flash-over?
 What factors influenced resistivity of volcanic ash?
 Resilient insulator design?
2008-2009
Case Study: Electricity Systems
The main impacts are:
 Supply outages from insulator flashover 
caused by ash contamination
 Disruption of generation facilities
 Controlled outages during tephra cleaning
 Abrasion and corrosion of exposed 
equipment










3mm of ash 
2010-2013
Fostering Research Partnerships
 2010-2013: PhD Project: Johnny Wardman
 Vulnerability of HV Transmission Systems to 
Volcanic Ashfall Hazards
 Sponsor: Transpower Ltd.
 $140,000 + consumables





 Volcanic Ashfall Risk on Critical Infrastructure 
 Probabilistic ash fall modelling
 Refined impact thresholds for:
 Transmission circuits
 Grid Exit Points (GXP) – substations
 Power Stations
2014-2015
 2014: PhD Research Project: 
Grant Wilson
 Risk Reduction
 E.g. locations for 
preventative mitigation
 Compare against other 
perils + account for 
uncertainty (probabilistic)
 Readiness
 E.g. prioritisation of 
cleaning
 Response
 E.g. deterministic scenario
International Activities
 USGS/GNS Volcanic Impacts Website
 Global information source
http://volcanoes.usgs.gov/ash/
 International Atomic Energy Agency
 Safety guide + TECDOC
 Guidance risk assessment
 UNISDR – Global Assessment Report (GAR-15)
 Global ashfall hazard and risk modelling
 Impact thresholds...scenario planning
 International partnership
 South Korea (national scale assessment)
 UK nuclear generator (site assessment)
 NZ Defence Technology – Aircraft Volcanic Ash Identification Protocol 
 UK + US civilian and military linkages
Thank you
Questions? thomas.wilson@canterbury.ac.nz 
 Medium term Research Strategy
 Co-development of applied 
research projects





Resilient cities are safer, more attractive to investors and new 
residents, and more able to recover quickly and with less loss of 
life and assets in the event of  crises. UNISDR
Research initiatives
- Measuring the resilience of transport infrastructure (NZTA)
- Paper: Review of key terminology: risk, resilience, 
vulnerability, sustainability
- Canterbury lifelines: ongoing discussion around 
measurement / benchmark approaches.
- Internationally:
• Rockefeller 100RC
• UNISDR Resilient Cities Scorecard (MCR Campaign)
• World Bank R!SE
• UN Habitat CRPP
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Reasons to Focus on Resilience
By 2050 over 70% of the 
World’s population will 
live in Cities 
Loss of life have 
decreased from Natural 
Disasters but….capital 
losses have exceeded 
$2.5 T since 2000
Reasons to Focus on Resilience
Direct disaster losses are 50% 
higher than reported figures 
Kobe port before the 
earthquake in 2005 was 6th 
busiest port in the world; By 
2010 it had fallen to 47th 
despite massive investment.
Toyota lost $1.2B in product 
revenue after the 2011 
earthquake & tsunami
Reasons to Focus on Resilience
“Economic losses 
from disasters are 
out of control and 
can only be reduced 
with collaboration 
with     the private 
sector”                
Ban Ki-Moon




- Consists of Dimensions, Principles and specific 
Measures which can map to the NIP attributes if 
required. 
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How did we categorise resilience of infrastructure?





The ability of the physical system(s) to 
perform to an acceptable/desired level 
when subject to a hazard event.
The capacity of an organisation to make 
decisions and take actions to plan, manage 
and respond to a hazard event.
How did we categorise resilience of infrastructure?














*Refer work by Resorgs
The measurement framework
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Measures
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ROBUSTNESS Weighted Robustness Score 2.3










Processes exist to maintain 
critical infrastructure and ensure 
integrity and operability - as per  
documented standards, policies & 
asset management plans (e.g. – 
roads maintained, flood banks 
maintained, stormwater systems 
are not blocked). Should prioritise 
critical assets as identified.
4 – Audited annual inspection process for 
critical assets and corrective maintenance 
completed when required.
3 – Non-audited annual inspection process 
for critical assets and corrective 
maintenance completed when required.
2 – Ad hoc inspections or  corrective 
maintenance completed, but with 
delays/backlog.




Evidence that planning for asset 
renewal and upgrades to improve 
resilience into system networks 
exist and are implemented.
4 – Renewal and upgrade plans exist for 
critical assets, are linked to resilience,  and 
are reviewed, updated and implemented.
3 – Renewal and upgrade plans exist for 
critical assets and are linked to resilience, 
however no evidence that they are followed
2 – Plan is not linked to resilience, and an 
adhoc approach is undertaken
1– No plan exists and no proactive renewal 
or upgrades of assets.
4
Percentage of assets that are at or 
below current codes
4 – 80%+ are at or above current codes
3 – 50-80% are at or above current codes
2  - 20-50% are at or above current codes
1  - nearly all are below current codes
3
Assessment of  general condition 
of critical assets across region.
4 – 80%+ are considered good condition
3 – 50-80% are considered good condition
2  - 20-50% are considered good condition
1  - nearly all poor condition
3
Percentage of assets that are in 
zones/areas known to have 
exposure to hazards
4 – <20% have some exposure to known 
hazarrds
3 – 20-50% are highly exposed, or >50% are 
moderately exposed
2  - 50-80% are highly exposed
1  - 80%+ are highly exposed to a hazard
2
Percentage of critical assets with 
additional capacity over and above 
normal demand capacity
4 – 80%+ of critical assets have >50% spare 
capacity available 
3 – 50-80% of critical assets have >50% 
spare  capacity
2  - 20-50% of critical assets have >50% 
spare  capacity
1  - 0-20% have spare capacity
2
Structural 2.8 33.33% 94.4
Design
Research paper: hazard, risk, 
resilience, vulnerability 
We investigated
- Consistency across risk management approaches?
- Confusion in terminology - and suggestions for 
simplification
- Risk approaches vs resilience approaches. What are 
differences? When to use?
- Recommendations for asset management field and 
implications for other fields
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http://www.nzta.govt.nz/resources/research/reports/546/
- NZTA Research:
- Paper on risk, resilience and terminology: Come and see 
me: james.hughes@aecom.com
Thankyou
“Whilst systems have commonly been designed to be 
robust (designed to prevent failure), increasing complexity 
and the difficulty it poses to fail-proof planning have made a 
shift to "resilience" strategically imperative. 
A resilient system on the other hand accepts that failure is 
inevitable and focuses instead on early discovery and fast 
recovery from failure”.  
David Snowden
